





On the Essential Contestedness of the Concept of Law
Gallie’s Framework for Essentially Contested Concepts 
Applied to the Law
Abstract
The article examines the inadequacies of different approaches in defining the concept of law 
in legal theory and suggests that by categorizing the concept of law as essentially contested 
we can account for permanent conceptual disputes in legal theory. The author argues that 
the concept of law fits five descriptive criteria for essential contestedness suggested by Wal­
ter Bryce Gallie. It is further suggested that by taking this point of view makes us deflate the 
value of definitions understood in terms of necessary and universally valid explanations of 




“[T]here	 are	 concepts	 which	 are	 essentially	 con-
tested,	concepts	the	proper	use	of	which	inevitably	

























key	concepts	 even	 in	works	whose	 title	 clearly	 suggest	 that	 a	definition	 is	
waiting	inside.	Even	more,	main	disputes	in	the	20th	century	legal	theory	build	
around	 the	concept	of	 law;	 irreconcilability	of	 legal	positivism	and	natural	












































































of	 law,	sovereignty,	 justice,	equality	or	 freedom	are	misguided	and	useless	
when	it	comes	to	understanding	legal	concepts.	The	specific	character	of	legal	
concepts	should	therefore	be	matched	by	a	different	mode	of	definition.	But	



































concepts	with	words	 that	 denote	 them,	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 differentiate	 between	 ambiguity,	






































with	peripheral	cases.	The	usual	subject	of	disputes	 is	 in	fact	 the	core	of	a	
concept	that	remains	contested	despite	the	efforts	of	legal	theorists	in	refin-












bates	 about	 the	 concept	 of	 law	presented	 in	Koller’s	 article	 “The	Concept	
of	Law	and	its	Conceptions,”	have	shown	that	methodological	awareness	of	
legal	theorists	like	Hart,	Kelsen	or	Finnis	has	only	succeeded	in	changing	the	
central	points	of	 the	debate,	 falling	short	 in	providing	us	with	an	adequate	
explanation	of	the	concept.	Legal	moralists	like	Deryck	Beyleveld	and	Roger	



































of	 the	concept.	Following	 the	process	of	defining,	we	have	seen	 that	 legal	






























usual	ways	of	 their	explanation	seem	inappropriate.	Yet,	 they	are	not	 inad-
equate,	as	Hart	says,	because	we	use	wrong	methods	in	defining.	This	inap-
propriateness	lies	in	the	fact	that	we	assume	that	the	definition	is	the	last	word	
in	 the	 process	 of	 determining	 the	 content	 of	 a	 concept.	Let	 us	 try	 to	 offer	
arguments	for	this	sophistry.















Walter	Bryce	Gallie	was	 the	 first	 to	 consider	 contestedness	 as	 an	essential	
trait	 of	 certain	 concepts	 in	 social	 theory	 and	philosophy	 in	 an	 article	 pub-








contested	 (Collier,	Hidalgo	 and	Maciucceanu	 2006,	 215).	Despite	 this,	we	
shall	 try	 to	 figure	 out	 if	Gallie’s	 framework	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 essentially	
































those	 conditions.	 Furthermore	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	Gallie	 hopes	 that	 his	
new	categorization	of	concepts	is	a	step	further	in	their	explanation	(Gallie	
1956,	188),	basing	his	hope	on	the	assumption	that	the	content	of	the	concept	
becomes	clearer	by	 figuring	out	something	about	 the	debates	on	 its	proper	
use.	But	meeting	the	conditions	for	essential	contestedness	clearly	does	not	
explain	the	contents	of	a	concept.	It	only	leads	us	to	answering	the	question	



























In	 order	 to	 exhaust	 this	 subject	 we	 would	
have	 to	explain	 in	detail	 the	methodological	
dispute	in	contemporary	Anglo-American	ju-
risprudence	between	the	proponents	and	crit-
ics	 of	 descriptive	methodology.	One	 side	 in	
this	 argument	 claims	 that	 law	 is	describable	
without	 resorting	 to	 value	 judgments,	while	
the	other	sees	law	as	interpretative	from	“top	
to	bottom”	(Dworkin	2003,	102).	On	the	po-
sition	 assumed	 in	 this	 paper	 it	 is	 not	 neces-












troduces	 the	 rule	of	 recognition	as	 a	 criterion	 for	 legal	validity	of	primary	






















Fulfilling	 these	criteria	 is	prima facie	evidence	 that	 the	concept	of	 law	fits	
Gallie’s	framework	and	can	be	regarded	as	essentially	contested.	The	addi-






point	of	Gallie’s	article.	 It	 is	of	course	 the	notion	of	 the	original	exemplar	
whose	authority	 the	participants	 in	 the	debate	should	acknowledge.	Gerald	
Gaus	 states	 that	 referring	 to	 the	 original	 exemplar	 dragged	Gallie	 back	 to	




testedness	 by	postulating	 a	 precisely	defined	 achievement	whose	 authority	
is	acknowledged	by	all	parties	engaged	in	conceptual	debates.	The	intention	
behind	the	notion	of	original	exemplar	is	mostly	negative	and	formal	–	it	aids	














































In	 the	 application	of	 these	 additional	 condi-
tions	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 democracy	 Gallie	
states:	 “(VI)	These	 uses	 claim	 the	 authority	
of	an	exemplar,	i.e.,	of	a	long	tradition	(per-
haps	a	number	of	historically	independent	but	
sufficiently	 similar	 traditions)	 of	 demands,	
aspirations,	 revolts	 and	 reforms	 of	 a	 com-
mon	 anti-inegalitarian	 character;	 and	 to	 see	
that	the	vagueness	of	this	tradition	in	no	way	
affects	its	influence	as	an	exemplar,	we	need	
only	 recall	 how	many	 and	 various	 political	
movements	claim	to	have	drawn	their	inspira-
tion	 from	 the	 French	Revolution.	 (VII)	Can	
we	add,	 finally,	 that	 continuous	 competition	













in	 order	 to	 state	 his	 conditions	 for	 essential	
contestedness:	1)	 the	presence	of	 intractable	
definitional	 disputes,	 2)	 dispute	 hinging	 on	
conflict	of	patterns	of	 thought	3)	patterns	of	
thought	 depending	 on	 philosophical	 thesis	
and	 reasoning.	 (Gray	 1977,	 344–345)	 Our	












































Consequences of regarding the concept 























into	 account	 a	weaker	 notion	 of	 essential	 contestedness	 proposed	 by	 John	
N.	Gray	we	are	left	with	the	fact	that	this	view	emphasizes	the	importance	
of	 “exploring	 conceptual	 connections	 between	 patterns	 of	 thought	 and	 the	
ways	of	life	of	specific	social	groups”	and	that	the	abandonment	of	the	no-
tion	“would	impoverish	the	study	of	the	central	ideas	of	social	and	political	






























Searle	in	his	book	The Construction of Social 
Reality	has	been	used	recently	to	argue	in	fa-
vor	of	futility	of	distinguishing	between	law	






can	 differentiate	 between	 two	 kinds	 of	 con-
cepts:	natural	and	social	concepts.	For	social	


































the	 characterization	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 law	 as	 essentially	 contested.	On	 the	
contrary,	 if	 the	contemporary	positivists	acknowledge	that	value	judgments	


























vide	 students	of	 law	with	a	clear	 and	precise,	 all	 encompassing	definition.	
If	 the	concept	of	 law	is	essentially	contested,	 then	 these	attempts	are	shots	
in	the	dark.	This	leaves	us	with	an	important	question	whether	the	notion	of	
essential	contestedness	is	bad	for	law	and	legal	theory.	The	answer	of	most	
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O bitnoj spornosti pojma prava
Galliejev okvir bitno spornih pojmova primijenjen na pravo
Sažetak
U članku se ispituju manjkavosti različitih pravno-teorijskih pristupa u definiranju pojma pra­
va, te se tvrdi da kategoriziranjem pojma prava kao bitno spornog možemo objasniti stalne 
konceptualne sporove u pravnoj teoriji. Autor smatra da pojmu prava odgovara pet deskriptiv­
nih kriterija za bitnu spornost koje je predložio britanski politički i društveni teoretičar Walter 
Bryce Gallie. Nadalje se tvrdi da zauzimanje ovog stajališta dovodi do devalvacije vrijednost 
definicija shvaćenih kao nužna i općevažeća objašnjenja pojma, te se naglašava važnost razli­




Zur wesentlichen Umstrittenheit des Begriffs des Rechts
Gallies Rahmen für wesentlich umstrittene Begriffe – angewandt auf das Recht
Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel untersucht die Unzulänglichkeiten differenter Ansätze bei der Definition des Be­
griffs des Rechts innerhalb der Rechtstheorie und lässt darauf schließen, dass wir durch die 
Kategorisierung des Begriffs des Rechts als wesentlich umstritten anhaltende konzeptuelle Un­
stimmigkeiten in der Rechtstheorie erklären können. Der Autor vertritt die Ansicht, der Begriff 
des Rechts erfülle fünf deskriptive Kriterien für die wesentliche Umstrittenheit, die von Walter 
Bryce Gallie aufgestellt wurden. Es wird weiter suggeriert, dass ein solcher Standpunkt uns den 
Wert der Definitionen herabsetzen lässt, die als notwendige und allgemeingültige Erklärungen 
des Begriffs angenommen werden. Darüber hinaus lässt er uns die Wichtigkeit der verschieden­




Du caractère essentiellement contestable du concept de droit
Résumé
Cette article interroge les faiblesses des différentes approches dans leurs définitions du concept 
de loi dans la théorie juridique, et suggère qu’en catégorisant le concept de droit comme essen
­
tiellement contestable, nous pouvons expliquer les permanentes disputes au sein de la théorie du 
droit. L’auteur estime que le concept de droit correspond à 5 critères descriptifs qui sont essen
­
tiellement contestables, comme l’a remarqué Walter Bryce Gallie. Plus loin, l’article suggère 
que l’acceptation de ce point de vue diminue la valeur des définitions d’un concept, comprises 
comme des explications nécessaires et universellement valides, et souligne l’importance des 

























Le cadre chez Gallie des conceptes essentiellement contestés appliqués au droit
